I am pleased to introduce readers to the Institute for the Future of Law Practice (IFLP), a new nonprofit collaboration between law schools, law firms, corporate legal departments, NewLaw service providers, and legal technology companies.  Details of this new venture can be found online at www.futurelawpractice.org.

Per the picture above, IFLP (“i-flip”) will be hosting training bootcamps in May 2018 in Chicago (at Northwestern Law) and Boulder (at Colorado Law). The bootcamps are designed to prep law students for sophisticated legal and business work settings. Each student admitted to the program is paired with a legal employer for either a 10-week summer internship or a 7-month field placement. All internships and field placements are paid. The IFLP program currently includes four law schools — Northwestern, Colorado, Indiana, and Osgoode Hall (Toronto) — though the plan is to build an infrastructure that will support and serve a significantly larger number of law students, law schools, and legal employers.

Rather than summarize the contents of the IFLP website, I am going to use this post to answer four questions:

  1. What problem is IFLP trying to solve?
  2. How will IFLP be successful?
  3. Where did IFLP come from?
  4. How can industry stakeholders become involved?

1. What problem is IFLP trying to solve?

Legal education and the legal profession are at an inflection point where traditional models of education and practice no longer fit the shifting needs of the market. The biggest driver of change is increased complexity. Historically, the legal profession has dealt with complexity through specialization and division of labor.  However, the legal profession is now at a point where its members need to learn new tools and methodologies that were not, and are not, part of traditional legal education.

Unfortunately, law schools are unable to make this transition on their own. This is because (a) the shift in practice requires an integration of law with problem-solving methods that are not legal in nature (e.g., data, process, project management, technology, and team-based collaboration); and (b) the state of the art for these new approaches to practice are currently being developed in the field by practitioners and other allied professionals.

IFLP can help fill this void by identifying industry-leading practitioners and distilling their know-how and experience into an organized body of knowledge that can be taught to law students and mid-career legal professionals.

2. How will IFLP be successful?

IFLP will be successful if it can create training and internship programs that serve law students (through high-quality employment) and legal employers (through a rich pool of applicants with an expanded set of skills and knowledge). In its simplest form, our goal is to use education to build demand for new and better pathways to sophisticated modern practice.  The larger the demand, the clearer the signal to legal education on how to retool to meet the needs of a changing market.

IFLP is fortunate to have an anchor set of legal employers who want to create a talent pipeline that combines traditional training in substantive law with foundational training in data, process, technology, and business  (T-shaped lawyers). Further, as we develop IFLP curricula and training modules, these resources can be used to cost-effectively upgrade the skills of mid-career professionals.

IFLP is designed to be an intermediary organization that coordinates the interests of law schools and legal employers. We want to improve the content and quality of legal training in ways that widen the pathway to practice.  Under the best case scenario, students, law schools, and legal employers will converge on an industry standard that better serves the interests of all stakeholders. A half century ago, organizations like NALP, LSAC, and NCBE sprang up to fill an important industry gap. Similarly, in 2018, IFLP fills a pressing industry void.

3. Where did IFLP come from?

The founders of IFLP were inspired by their experience with the Tech Lawyer Accelerator (TLA) program at Colorado Law.  Since 2014, approximately 80 students (most from Colorado Law, some from Indiana Law) have participated in a 3½ week bootcamp at the end of their 1L or 2L year. The TLA focused on technology, process, and business skills, with students spending the balance of their summers in 10-week paid internships. In some cases, the internships were extended to seven months (the summer and fall of students’ 3L year). Colorado Law’s TLA is the foundation for the first iteration of IFLP. For additional background on the TLA, see Post 018 (summarizing topics covered in the 2017 TLA).

During four years of operation, TLA has garnered very favorable feedback from students and employers. But more significantly, we received “pull” from several employers to expand the program’s breadth and capacity.  In response to this pull, a small group of us conducted a needs analysis during the fall of 2017. This involved the formation of several exploratory committees drawn from our professional networks. One committee focused on law schools; a second on legal employers; and a third on the viability of an ongoing nonprofit business model.

Based on the feedback we received, in late 2017, we made the decision to go forward with the creation of IFLP.  As we embark upon this journey, we are very grateful for the support of our volunteer board.

4. How can industry stakeholders become involved?

IFLP is not an exclusive club.  However, to be successful, we have to meet a market test. This means offering an educational product that is valuable to students and employers while also generating revenues in excess of operating costs.  In our first iteration, we are limiting participation to a small number of schools. We need to work through the myriad of issues associated with cross-school collaboration. This is complex and requires us to go slow.  The goal, however, is to create a foundation that can support future growth.

At present, we are most in need of legal employers. If your organization wants to co-create a world-class educational program that can fill your need for world-class talent, please contact us.  We are also in need of industry sponsors who are willing to subsidize IFLP in its early days.  We are fortunate to have a handful of benefactors who are getting us off the ground.  The payoff is affiliation with a promising nonprofit working to align the interests of industry stakeholders. Announcement of our full roster of participating organizations and sponsors will occur later this spring.

For law schools and law faculty, we encourage you to visit the programs in Boulder and Chicago.  We value your input and are willing to share what we are learning.  With success, we will be able to expand to include more member schools.  If you are interested in getting involved, please contact us at this link.

What’s next? Lucy Bassli shares her thought process behind her major career move (044)

In a recent post at 3 Geeks and a Law Blog, Casey Flaherty puts his finger on a big problem.  The opening paragraphs are too funny not to quote in their entirety:

My friend John Grant [of Start Here HQ] made a mistake.

Many moons ago he was consulting on process improvement for a large law department. He surveyed in-house counsel on their biggest complaints about outside counsel. The response was that outside counsel:

  • Don’t understand my business
  • Can’t tell me how long anything will take
  • Overwork a problem/introduce complexity
  • Don’t give me output in a format I can use

Familiar enough. And so far so good. John’s misstep is that he put the same question to internal clients of the law department. The response was that in-house counsel:

  • Don’t understand my business
  • Can’t tell me how long anything will take
  • Overwork a problem/introduce complexity
  • Don’t give me output in a format I can use

This result was not well received by the law department.

I laugh because I have seen this problem firsthand.  However, it’s probably not as funny if you earn your living selling advice to in-house lawyers.

Casey’s post contains a level of humility and candor that is rare among people, let alone lawyers.  Here is my own paraphrase of Casey’s thesis: “After 10+ years of relevant work experience and countless hours of reflection, I’ve concluded that successful innovation among lawyers is less complicated but more difficult than I thought.”

The Lawyer Theory of Value

Casey’s “lawyer theory of value” is the insight that makes things less complicated.

Casey writes, “The lawyer theory of value states that the key to value is having smart lawyers.  Lawyer time is the primary resource and the primary unit of measure even in law departments that have no compensable time sheets.” Because in-house and law firm lawyers are the same people, they have the same go-to move — stand back and let me lawyer.  For in-house lawyers, however, the reflex varies by problem-solving hat:

  • Hat 1.  When wearing their service-provider hat, they measure value based upon time and effort.  After all, they know how smart they are and how hard they work for their internal clients.
  • Hat 2. When wearing their client hat, in-house lawyers measure value based on predictability and how the service provider helps them get their work done — just like those folks in sales, HR, and purchasing.

Although in-house and law firm lawyers are the same people, law departments “get them at discount and on a fixed fee.”  Thus, for at least two decades, as Casey points out, clients have dealt with budget pressure by expanding their law departments. See Post 003 (documenting trend).  However, as this approach hits the point of severe diminishing returns, Casey acknowledges that legal departments have fully replicated the management challenges of law firms.  The refrain from lawyers is the same: “not here, not yet.”

“What most in-house stakeholders want,” observes Casey, “is more budget, more headcount, and to be left alone.”  We see the same mindset in law firms: “I’ll work hard and track my time. Otherwise, leave me alone.”  Indeed, the perfect symmetry is what makes the lawyer theory of value so compelling. If we apply Occam’s razor, there’s nothing left to cut.

Seeing the world as it really is

if the lawyer theory of value is true, then it has implications for Casey’s broader views on legal innovation.  To Casey’s credit, he catalogues four faulty assumptions he has personally harbored:

  • “First, I’ve taken in-house counsel at their word. I’ve relied on stated rather than revealed preference. … The desire to change may be genuine. But that in and of itself does not make change a priority. … I expected more law departments to be fast followers. Instead, we’ve repeatedly witnessed innovations by prominent law departments remain outliers.”
  • “Second, I’ve imagined change efforts that are deeper and more transformative than they turn out to be. I’ve taken the highlight reel and mentally filled in the gaps to be equally spectacular.”
  • “Third, I’ve observed success in one area [contract management, diversity, outside counsel spending] and mentally grafted it onto others [e.g., litigation management or use of alternative service providers]… [T]his assumption has it backwards. In-house departments are resource constrained. With finite resources, the essence of strategy is choosing what not to do.”
  • “Fourth, and relatedly, I’ve treated in-house departments as monoliths. Because the legal ops head and one AGC have stood up something cutting-edge, I’ve implicitly assumed that the remainder of the department shares their innovative fervor. But politics is the art of the possible. … While innovation may be embraced and effected by a few, the many view it with suspicion and annoyance.”

What makes these admissions / reinterpretations so striking — and useful — is that Casey is as intelligent and experienced as they come. Yet, he is coming clean with insights that he learned from the trenches, admitting that true progress is a lot more difficult than he thought. God help the rest of us trying to sort things out from the comfort of our base camps.

Why does this matter?

Roughly 55% of all legal services in U.S. are purchased by organizations with at least one in-house lawyer.  And this staggeringly high number excludes the economic value of more than 105,000 in-house lawyers. See Post 003. Thus, Casey is writing about the substantial bulk of the legal services market, not a fractional subset.  The portion of the profession fully outside his analysis, see Post 037 (decline of the PeopleLaw sector), has a different set of problems. Albeit, the answer to both requires a substantial redesign of how lawyers — or, more accurately, legal professionals — serve their clients.

I hope Casey agrees with this additional gloss on his analysis: The lawyer theory of value — solving legal problems one at a time with smart lawyers — is an unstated and unexamined preference of lawyers, not a viable long-term solution for the clients they serve. Further, it is not a preference that law students and younger lawyers can afford to indulge. As I collect my law professor salary, I think about this issue on a daily basis.

There is a lot of hard work ahead on staggeringly complex problems. These problems are made more difficult by organizational politics, the personal agendas of those fending for themselves, and necessity of telling people things they don’t want to hear.  Good ideas are, at best, the first 5% of a solution.  We ought to be grateful we have Casey’s brain power and intellectually honesty to help us cope with the rest.

What’s next? See Successful technology adoption: David Cambria (ADM) and Eric Elfman (Onit) discuss their collaboration (041)

As the above syllabus excerpt suggests, there is now a law school course on how innovation diffuses in the legal industry.  This new ground is being tilled at Northwestern Pritzker School of Law, where I am visiting this fall.  It is one of the few courses at Northwestern Law that enrolls both JD and Masters of Science in Law (MSL) students.  This enrollment is ideal, as the diverse educational backgrounds and professional experiences of the MSL students are a terrific complement to the 2L and 3L students who have already internalized a surprisingly large amount of legal culture.

The class started last Monday (10/16) and runs for eight classes.  As diffusion theory is part of an applied research tradition, see Post 004, we spent exactly one class on the underlying theory and the legal industry before moving to examples.

The examples are supplied by legal innovator and early adopter guest lecturers.  For Week 2 (10/23), we had the pleasure of hosting David Perla, co-founder and former co-CEO of Pangea3, and Ian Nelson, who was part of the original US sales team of Practical Law Company (PLC) and more recently co-founder of Hotshot, a tremendously innovative e-learning company focused on legal professional development.

NewLaw and legaltech start-ups are now widely covered by the legal press. But that was hardly the case during the booming mid-2000s when all the focus was on soaring BigLaw profits and salaries.  I wanted to start our guest speaker series with David and Ian because during this hey day period, both quit top-of-the-food-chain jobs to pursue obscure and speculative business opportunities (David in 2004 and Ian in 2006).  At the time, the future we are now living in was far from obvious.  Yet, when their respective companies sold to Thomson Reuters a few years later at valuations and multiples on-par with highly successful Silicon Valley start-ups, it became clear that NewLaw and legaltech were sectors with enormous opportunity for the innovative and ambitious.

Perla’s story

Over the years, I have heard several renditions of Pangea3 founder stories.  But Monday’s edition provided a new twist, as David focused on the preeminent importance of professional relationships and how, in hindsight, the long game is the only game that really matters.

David went through a long litany of examples of how a decade’s worth of professional contacts accumulated since law school (by both he and Pangea3 co-founder Sanjay Kamlani) were crucial to opening doors or indirectly supporting the fledgling start-up.  From getting free access to 1,200 Indian lawyer resumes from Monster.com so the duo could stand-up a work team in India over the course of a few days (David had just quit the GC position at Monster to launch Pangea3); to several months of office space at Katten Muchin so Pangea3 could signal a midtown Manhattan address (David was a former Katten associate); to an initial investment by a prominent Indian-American lawyer who had credibility in both US and India venture capital and legal circles, thus greasing the skids for everything that followed (this came through Sanjay’s tenure at PWC and OfficeTiger, a first-generation business process outsourcer in India), each story illustrated the tremendous importance of relationships. Cf. Post 020 (discussing crucial role played by “weak-tie” relationships in the diffusion of innovation).

The most surprising and powerful story was David’s family connection to the head of litigation of a major global bank.  The family friend took David’s call, but said at the outset,  “I am happy to help you in any way I can through mentoring and coaching, etc., but I’m never going to send any documents to India.”  David replied, “I understand.  Is it okay if I check in with you every six months?” The head of litigation said “Sure.”  David foreshadowed that this connection would turn out to be key to the ultimate success of Pangea3.

In the meantime, David and his colleagues were trying to crack the code of the large global banks.  One of their prospective customers broke the disappointing news that “we innovate in our trading strategies, but not in operations or sourcing. For that stuff, we’re a second mover. So if you want us to hire you, go get [list of global banks] as one of your customers. Then we can talk.”

Fast forward a couple of years, the big break for Pangea3 was the turmoil in the financial services market in the fall of 2008 and the resulting global recession.  David fields a call from one of his board members, who buoys his spirits, “Doubledown on sales; recessions are good for outsourcing.”  Shortly thereafter, David takes a call from the family friend / head of litigation at the major global bank. “David, the General Counsel just informed us that our budget has been cut by 25%. I know I said never, but never just happened.  Can you be here this week for a meeting?”

That meeting resulted in Pangea3 landing its largest and highest-profile client, which in turn sped up the sales cycle for several other large banks waiting to go second. David acknowledged that he did not have the benefit of diffusion theory when he was building Pangea3.  Yet, on both the investor and customer side, he could see how certain key early adopters had the effect of making a wide array of disparate pieces fall into place.  David specifically referred to these people as “influencers.”  Cf. Post 020 (discussing how “opinion leaders” within a social system are “able to informally influence other individuals’ attitudes or overt behavior in a desired way with relative frequency”).

Nelson’s story

I first met Ian Nelson in the fall of 2008 at a legal innovation conference–in hindsight, the first of its kind–organized by USC law professor and economist Gillian Hadfield. By 2008, Ian had been working at PLC for two years, initially in content creation but then transitioning to a lead role in sales.  Although PLC had already become a dominant force in the UK, the US was a bigger market governed by different law.  Thus, for all practical purposes, Ian had joined a US-based start-up.

There are two reasons why the PLC model is highly relevant to anyone interested in legal innovation.  First, Thomson Reuters’ acquisition of PLC in 2013 remains the high-water mark for financial success among legal industry entrepreneurs.  See “Thomson Reuters buys Practical Law Company,” Telegraph, Jan. 23, 2013 (reporting the size of the deal between £200 and £300 million, all of it achieved without outside investment). Second, there remains a wide array of activities currently performed non-expertly by law firms and legal departments that could be turned into highly successful businesses by carefully applying the core logic of the PLC model. In fact, this logic is very much at work at Ian’s current company, Hotshot. Thus, let’s briefly review the PLC model.

Practical Law began life in 1990 as a trade journal focused on the UK legal market. Some of the most popular features were practice tips that pulled together and explained the technical aspects of new and emerging methods of finance.  This is not surprising because PLC’s two founders, Robert Dow and Chris Millerchip, began their careers as associates at Slaughter and May, a leading Magic Circle firm specializing in M&A and sophisticated corporate finance.  Quipped Millerchip, “We created the thing that we wanted when we were practicing.” Ross Todd, “Web Practice Tools for Transactional Lawyers,” Legaltech News, Jan. 23, 2009.

With the growth of the web, PLC’s offerings became simultaneously better and easy to access via an online subscription model.  Relatively quickly, firms were being placed in a competitive disadvantage if they lacked access to PLC work product, which included document templates, standard clauses, practice guides, and deal checklists. In theory, firms could create this content on their own.  Yet, the ability to scale across the entire corporate bar enabled PLC to deliver higher quality work product at a much lower per-unit cost. In effect, PLC had become a privately run shared service relied upon by the vast majority of top UK law firms. The economics of a shared services model make it virtually impossible to dislodge a well-run first mover — and PLC fit that description to a tee. Cf. Thiel, Zero to One 97-98 (2014) (“[M]oving first is a tactic, not a goal. …  It’s much better to be the last mover—that is, to make the last great development in a specific market”).

During his guest lecture, Ian recounted his early days as a NYC corporate associate when he first encountered some of the quality gaps later filled by PLC and now being targeted by Hotshot.  The first instance occurred within a few days of hiring when Ian was dispatched to a far-flung city for due diligence on a “reverse triangular merger.”  The supervising partner instructed Ian to review a large volume of contracts and flag anything that “looked weird.”

Despite his law review credentials, Ian had no idea what a reverse triangular merger was, much less the definition of weird. Thus, for the next 48 hours, Ian was thrown into a silent panic, fearing that his legal ineptitude would should be exposed to the world. Yet, what he soon discovered was that neither the partner (and apparently the client) cared about the inefficiency of the process, as Ian’s overinclusive approach to copying “weird” provisions for further study at the firm’s headquarters was all being billed by the hour. Had Ian had access to Hotshot, he would have had on-demand videos and practice guides enabling him to get the answers that the supervising partner lacked the time or interest to provide.

A second formative incident occurred a couple of years later when Ian headed to London to work on-site at a UK firm that was co-counsel on a major transaction. During a tour of the office, Ian was shown the cafeteria, the copy room, and the work area for the PSLs.  Ian asked, “What’s a PSL?”  He was flabbergasted to learn that in the UK it was common practice to have “Professional Support Lawyers” who were responsible for, among other things, organizing and cataloguing the firm’s work product so the very best precedent could be quickly located for use on future client matters.  Ian subsequently returned to the US and lobbied his firm for the creation of a similar role, as it would replace the then-common practice of firm-wide emails soliciting documents that could be used as a starting point for current client matters. Upon hearing these ideas, however, the partners shrugged with indifference.

Six years into corporate law practice, these were some of the formative experiences that caused Ian to respond to a job ad for PLC — experiences that really struck a chord with the students. At my request, Ian did a deep dive into Hotshot. However, Hotshot as a business and product offering warrants its own future post.

What diffusion theory insights did we learn?

As I reflect on Week 2, three themes stand out.

  1. There is no innovation without execution. It’s easy to discuss innovation as something conceptual, but until the early adopter end-user receives full value, innovators are just trafficking in ideas.  Although this terrain is covered in LE’s “Crossing the Chasm” and “Hype Cycle” series, see, e.g., Posts 024025, it was made more vivid by Perla’s description of solving funding and operational challenges while also hunting down the early adopter customers. Standing up a quality-first operation in India (the putative innovation) is extraordinarily complex, time consuming and costly. Although Pangea3 was able to hit its ambitious sales targets relatively early, the time span between a signed deal, doing the work, and getting paid — particularly when large corporate clients string out vendors for 45 to 90 days — resulted in a “near death” experience for Pangea3. Suffice it to say, there is enormous risk in translating an idea into an innovation that warrants diffusion. Innovator-leaders like David and Sanjay who can skillfully coordinate the technical talents of others are very rare and very valuable.
  2. There are usually several social systems that matter; not just one.  As I listened to David and Ian, it became obvious that several social systems were interacting with one another.  For example, David describes how inroads with the New York global banks had little to no impact with legal departments at large US tech companies.  In fact, it was an investment by famed Silicon Valley VC firm Sequoia Capital (on less favorable terms that other VC shops, though the discount was worth it) that opened doors with tech companies on the west coast and, in turn, reverberated throughout India, signaling to young Indian lawyers that Pangea3 was the firm to join.  In Ian’s case, the early adopters at Hotshot were all Silicon Valley-based law firms who saw real advantages to having better-trained associates who could actually understand and do the math in venture capital deals.  A credible roster of west coast-based AmLaw 200 firms were eventually enough to open doors on the east coast and in the midwest where the deal flow was more traditional M&A.  Cf. Post 004 (“Rogers’ core insight … is that the diffusion of innovation is a process that occurs through a social system“).
  3. Relative advantage, cultural compatibility, and trialability really matter.  Apparently, for a large global bank, the difference between “never” and “this week” is a 25% budget cut.  Thus, drawing upon the Post 008 rate of adoption model, Pangea3’s big break turned on a sudden shift in the “relative advantage” of legal process outsourcing. Likewise, regarding cultural compatibility, both David and Ian emphasized how their status as former BigLaw corporate lawyers, including knowledge of cultural norms related to speech, dress, and credentials, opened both minds and doors.  Finally, Ian gave examples of how trialability was key to making sales for PLC and Hotshot, while David discussed how small projects resulted in growing sales, including a mandate from a major client that Pangea3 would be used by all outside counsel for all large-scale document reviews.  Apparently, nothing is more convincing than tasting the soup.  If it tastes good, your early adopter customers will set off a chain reaction (within a firm or legal department, or among peer firms or legal departments) that will do the work of an army of salespeople. Cf. Post 025 (Geoffrey Moore noting that word-of-mouth marketing is essential to crossing the chasm).

Week 3 of How Innovation Diffuses in the Legal Industry features three highly accomplished Thomson Reuter professionals:

  • Joe Borstein, Global Director of TR’s Managed Legal Services (formerly Pangea3) and Innovation Columnist at Above the Law
  • Rebecca Thorkildsen, Global Director of Legal Solutions (a person with an amazingly broad and deep grasp of the rapidly expanding legal ecosystem)
  • Paul Stroka, Director of Legal Solutions (a very capable corporate lawyer who has a deep understanding of consultative sales — i.e., selling as a second-order effect of customer problem solving — which is the core skill of a change agent)

I’ll do my best to pass along what we learn.

What’s next?  See The 2017 Forum on Legal Evolution (033)

Earlier this week came some unexpected good news for the legal ecosystem.  Dan Linna of Michigan State Law unveiled the Legal Services Innovation Index, which provides some very interesting and compelling measures of innovation by: (1) country, (2) practice area, (3) type of innovation, (4) firm size / global segmentation, and (5) individual law firm.

The Legal Services Innovation Index is a project of MSU Law’s LegalRnD, which is a mission-based research center focused on innovation in legal services.  The Director of LegalRnD is Dan Linna, a legal education doer with a multi-faceted background.  Prior to joining MSU in 2014, Linna was an equity partner at Honigman (a Michigan-based AmLaw 200 firm); and before law school, he worked for several years as an IT manager and consultant.  Over the last few years, Linna has been instrumental in organizing legaltech meet-ups in both Michigan and Chicago.

What I admire most about Linna, however, is his ability to mentor young people so they have the confidence and focus to build great legal careers.  See, e.g., LegalRnD’s application of Lean principles to student employment outcomes. The Legal Services Innovation Index is justifiably going to get a lot of attention from the entire global legal services industry — and remarkably, it was substantially built by law students working under Dan’s direction.

Zero to One

In the project Overview, Linna goes to great pains to explain that the Legal Services Innovation Index is a “Phase I, Version 1.0” release that should be viewed as preliminary.  Linna writes:

I’m releasing Phase 1, Version 1.0 of this index to add to and improve legal-industry discussions about legal innovation and technology. My inner perfectionist–a voice empowered during my journey to equity partner in an Am Law 200 law firm–would prefer that I conduct far more research and complete Phase 2 and Phase 3 before releasing anything. But this type of perfectionist thinking is itself a barrier to legal-services innovation. Instead, I will follow the Lean Startup innovation process [example online here] … striving to continuously improve our legal industry discussions about innovation and technology.

Linna notes that the project was inspired by LSC President Jim Sandman’s speech at the 2016 CodeX FutureLaw Conference. Sandman argued that if law firms were ranked and assessed by their use of technology rather than just revenues and profits, we’d find ourselves in a virtuous competition that could potentially redound to the benefit of those who lack access to legal services. (Even if the connection between BigLaw tech and PeopleLaw access is attenuated at best in the year 2017, it’s nonetheless a better vision than pure financial metrics.) When Sandman repeated this call at the 2017 CodeX conference — thus revealing that nothing happened over the past year — Linna committed himself and his Center to the Index project.

Tactically, it’s wise for Linna to be cautious about what the Index data mean — he describes Phase I, Version 1.0 as a “minimum viable product” that will improve with user feedback. Regardless, for the rest of us, it is hard to overstate the importance of this first iteration. Basically, Linna and his students have moved the state of the art from zero to one.  On Monday, conversations about legal innovation took place in a data vacuum.  On Tuesday, we had a system of measurement and classification and corresponding innovation data on 263 of the world’s biggest law firms (that is how many unique firms are in the Am Law 200, Canadian Top 30, and the Global 100).

To their credit, Linna and his crew are trying to frame the conversation as “How can we make this better?”  Regardless, even in its current form, the Index is bound to be extremely influential. Seeing where your firm stands relative to other firms is going to change both conversation and behavior. This is the psychological phenomenon of reactivity, which can be profoundly powerful. See Espeland & Sauder, “Rankings and Reactivity: How Public Measures Recreate Social Worlds,” 113 Am J of Sociology 1 (2007) (discussing law school rankings as an example of reactivity with far-reaching social and institutional effects).

What is the Innovation Index?

The Index in its current form is really two systems of quantification: The Innovation Catalog and The Law Firm Index.

(1) Innovation Catalog

The Innovation Catalog captures legal-service delivery innovations that are currently being implemented by law firms in the AmLaw 200 (US-headquartered firms based on gross revenues), the Canadian Top 30 (based on attorney headcount), and the Global 100 (122 firms on two lists ranked by revenues and headcount).  Innovations are grouped into three categories — products, services, and consulting. The results are presented using Tableau, a popular data visualization tool.

Below is the graphic showing the number of innovation offerings based on the law firms’ home jurisdiction:

Why is the UK in the leader’s position?  Some would argue it is because the UK’s domestic market became saturated 20 years ahead of the US market, forcing deeper strategic thinking on how to adapt and grow.  Another factor might be the residue of lockstep compensation, which tends to create and incentivize a longer time horizon.  Note that these figures have not been “normalized” — i.e., adjusted for the size of the home market.  Because the UK market is much smaller, it makes the UK’s leader position all the more interesting.  Although elite U.S. law firms appear to be running away with the most lucrative financial services work, see Simon & Bruch, “The Strange Tale of How Elite US Firms Surpassed Their UK Counterparts,” Law.com (Aug. 2017) (three-part series), the chart above likely reflects the larger and more contested market for operational legal work.

Below is another Index chart that breaks out innovations by tool or discipline.  The range and diversity of innovations is striking — this is not a market where nothing is happening.

Where the rubber meets the road, however, is a table that breaks down all the data at the granular law firm and innovation level.  See Catalog by Law Firm (last tab). To date, only three firms have one or more innovations in each of the products, services, and consulting categories: Allen & Overy (UK), DLA Piper (US), and DWF LLP (UK).  US-based firms with several innovations include: Duane Morris (7), DLA Piper (7), Fenwick (6), Ogletree Deakins (6), Norton Rose (5), Littler Mendelson (5), Bryan Cave (4), Hogan Lovells (4), and Seyfarth Shaw (4).

One of the most interesting features of the firm-specific table is the inclusion of strategic partners.  These companies are necessary to solve difficult technical problems or resource gaps:

  • Intapp (with Ashhurst (UK))
  • Deloitte (with Allen & Overy) [related to contract management and compliance]
  • Elevate (with Corrs Chambers (AU))
  • HighQ (Corrs Chambers (AU), Norton Rose)
  • Kira (with Clifford Chance and DLA Piper)
  • Neota Logic (with Clifford Chance, Foley & Lardner, Hall & Wilcox (AU), Hive Legal (AU), Husch Blackwell, Littler Mendelson)
  • Thomson Reuters (with Ackerman, Clifford Chance, DWF LLP, Nixon Peabody) [mostly managed service research support]

(2) The Law Firm Index

The Law Firm Index is based on Google Advanced searches for indicators of innovation on law firm websites. The methodology section gives the precise search terms for each category. There’s likely a bias favoring large firms, as they have more lawyer biographies and practice group pages to tout the same innovations.  That said, there are many relatively small firms posting relatively large innovation numbers; and many large firms that are posting relatively small numbers. And for those of us fairly close to this space, there are few if any surprises. To me, they appear face valid.

Here is the breakdown of the average hits per firm website by area of innovation:

This is a very interesting breakdown because the largest category, Blockchain, bears on changes affecting the core business of corporate clients. In some respects, this innovation borders on changes in substantive law and how contracts get formed and enforced. Because this is closer to lawyers’ natural wheelhouse, perhaps it’s unsurprising that lawyers are ready and willing to innovate.  Yet, on service delivery innovations that are directed at reducing billable hours and overall cost, such as automation and process, we see a lot less activity.

The analysis based on country and firm grouping is also interesting and informative:

The big takeaway here is that size + geographic reach appears to be strongly correlated with at least the seedlings of innovation. Cf. Innovation in Organizations, Part III (017) (discussing complexity and size as correlates of organizational innovativeness and explaining why this is likely true in law). Although really large firms have significant challenges with management and communication overhead, there’s no substitute for a critical mass of resources to build new service offerings.

Finally, the Law Firm Index has two breakdowns by individual firm (the last two Tableau tabs) — one based on total Google Advanced website hits and a second based on percentiles.

The Index website repeatedly communicates that these firm-level charts are not a ranking. That said, the differentials among firms are massive, moving from less than 10 mentions of innovations to nearly 15,000.  This raises a very real question for partners — “is it worth trying to get my firm to innovate, or should I take my clients to a market leader firm?”  Cf. Henderson & Zorn, “The Most Prized Lateral of 2015 Wasn’t a Partner,” American Lawyer, Feb. 1, 2016 (discussing media attention given to movement of 4-person process improvement team from a UK Silver Circle firm to a Global 100 UK-Australian firm and predicting that this type of sophisticated capability will eventually attract lateral partners trying to hang onto clients). The failure to invest in innovation may prove to be extremely expensive for late majority and laggard law firms.

Conclusion

Kudos to Dan Linna and his team at MSU Law’s LegalRnD.  For the foreseeable future, your Legal Services Innovation Index is going to be the measuring stick for law firm innovation.  You have given lawyers, law students, and law faculty a useful, tractable, and relatively comprehensive window into the changing legal services market, at least in the large law firm segment.  Going forward, we can be spared the blanket generalization that lawyers and law firms can’t innovate. That by itself is a tremendous public service.  We all look forward to improvements in the months and years ahead.

What’s next? See Inside the Client’s Head: 2017 CLOC Institute Programming (022)